Thursday, 17 May 2012

Ndege Magazine: July 1963


Vol. 2 No. 2: July 1963



A Look at Flight Safety
Good Show - P.S. Dolby; Cpl. Podnore
Bush Survival?
Determination of Safety-Height
Loose Article?
Good Show - S.A.C. Borejszo
For the Workers.
Hats on Please.
New Classifications.
Good Show -Jnr. Tech. du Toit.
Third Man Theme
One Boy's Ambition (?)
Ndege Crossword
Dear Sir
Alcohol and the Pilot
Desert Survival in the Aden Protectorate
Good Show - Cpl. Tech. Borchardt
Accident Analysis
Know Your Aircraft - Provost T.Mk.52.

The opinions expressed in 'NDEGE' are the personal views of contributing writers; they do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. Unless otherwise stated, contents should not be construed as regulations, orders or instructions.

The Editor reserves the right to make changes which he believes will improve the material without altering the intended meaning.

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Chief of Air Staff. Contributions are welcome, as are comment and criticism. All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, 'NDEGE', Headquarters R.R.A.F., P.O. Box 8131, Causeway.

From the "Accident Analysis" yow may notice that we have had 93 Special Occurrence Reports between January 1963 and June 1963. This represents an increase of 300 per cent over the corresponding period last year. On initial examination this percentage increase would appear to reflect adversely on the professional ability of the Royal  Rhodesian Air Force. However, further reflection indicates that this increase is good news as it shows that the drive for improved Flight Safety is having its effect. Incidents of a type not previously reported by you are obviously new reaching the 765(B) stage. Well done, and keep the forms flowing!

Recently we heard a pilot say that he had filled in so many 765s that he must surely be the 'S.O.R. King". We realize that it might be inconvenient at the time to fill in these forms, but remember that the effort spent is well worth while, as in every case there is a lesson to be learnt. In reply to "S.O.R. King" we would say, "Be neighbourly, pilot, so that we may all benefit from your unfortunate experiences."

Let us illustrate, from an actual case, how important it is to be conscientious about your Special Occurrence Reporting.

When a pilot of a Pembroke selected undercarriage down he noticed a peculiar light sequence. With the undercarriage down a main wheel indicated a red and a green light at the same time. By the time the aircraft returned to base the snag had apparently "cleared itself", so the pilot made no mention of the incident in the F.700.

Some time later another pilot, flying the same aircraft, was confronted with the same sequence of lights. On this occasion, however, he was engaged on a practice asymmetric approach. He had no alternative but to overshoot and, due to the limited power available at this altitude, overshooting in a Pembroke, even with the undercarriage up, is an interesting performance. To further complicate matters there was insufficient pneumatic pressure to raise the undercarriage. However, the pilot managed to unfeather the engine before he ran out of height, and landed the aircraft safely.

It was indeed fortunate that the pilot was on a practice asymmetric exercise, otherwise he would have been faced with a situation which could only have ended in one way - an accident - and why? - All because a simple in-flight incident did not reach the S.O.R. stage.

Colonel Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager
Commandant, AF Aerospace Research Pilot School
Edwards Air Force Base, California

There are two ways of looking at safety. One is the saving of human life, equipment and money. The other, and one I don't think we exploit enough, is the fallout of haying a good flight safety record. As the record improves, a vicious circle effect occurs - actually, it is a 'beneficial circle. Morale of the pilots and maintenance crews is raised as accidents decrease. This stimulates them to do a better job and safety benefits further. This is often inadequately stressed in our safety programs. High morale and stimulation are, I believe, extremely important in maintaining a low accident rate.

I have been asked to comment on some of the concepts that are recognized as keys to safety. I'll just briefly hit a few of these.

SUPERVISION: I think the commander should be more interested in safety than any other single individual particularly in a fighter squadron. He can play a most effective role because of his experience. Usually his experience is much greater than that of his younger pilots. He can watch and see that his pilots don't go beyond a certain area where he got caught himself at one time. Experience is a most wonderful asset when dealing with younger pilots.

DISCIPLINE: Discipline is trying to iron into the man to disregard the urge that all people have to fly an airplane a little farther than the other guy, a little faster, a little lower on a low altitude navigation flight. I think it ,ia hard, maybe impossible to ensure effective discipline after a man grows up and becomes a pilot) this is something he should have learned when he was young.

MAINTENANCE: There is no way to overemphasize the importance of good maintenance. The safety record hinges, in large measure, on the condition of the equipment flown. And this becomes more important every day. Take the case of a fighter pilot; he is asked to know the delivery technique and all the figures involved for nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, navigation, inflight, refuelling, gunnery, so many things his brain is saturated. Believe me, to-day if you get a sloppy ground crew or poor design of systems you can kill a pilot and tear up an aircraft with no chance for the pilot to prevent it. The younger people coming into the maintenance field should really be impressed with the importance of good equipment and thorough knowledge of the equipment they work on. The mechanic must know the equipment much better than the pilot if we are to have an outstanding flying safety record.

DEVOTION: I think this is a vital ingredient ii an effective Air Force, and one that is largely an individual development. Our best people are extremely devoted to the Air Force and the mission of the unit to which they are assigned. It isn't easy to explain how a guy can stand alert 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and be ready to give his very best, his life if necessary, any minute of that time. This is what separates the men from the boys.

TRAINING: This is surely a key factor. A man can learn so much on his own, but we think he can learn much more if there is a good training program in his unit.  When I had an F-100 squadron I knew that there was much that had to be taught to a new pilot to get him combat ready. Most of this had to do with the weapons, the weapons system in the aircraft and their use, There just isn't time, at this stage, to teach the basic fundamentals of flying. I think that our training command and also our tactical commands have gone a long way in giving the operational units pilots who are well trained in flying. When this is the case the commander doesn't have to worry about whether or not the pilot can take off, fly formation, in weather and land. Another thing, flying time that maintenance can generate is becoming so limited that time can't be devoted to boring holes and learning to fty in an operational outfit. New aircraft, such as the T-38, help here. A man comes into a tactical outfit with experience in operating at tactical speeds.

Another point on this training bit : no point in wasting training time getting a pilot proficient in a manoeuvre he will normally never have to perform. Spins are, I think, an example of this. I use myself as an example because I know more about myself than I do about any other pilot; I have never gotten an airplane into a spin inadvertently. I think a pilot should be taught to recognize the approach to a spin and aotion to be taken to prevent a spin. —If a pilot gets an aircraft into an inadvertent spin he is a pretty dull tool for not recognising the approach to a spin. This is my own personal opinion. The more you teach a pilot about spinning diff rent types of airplanes and let him experience spinning a little, then it not only builds confidence but it builds recklessness in that he does not respect a spin because, he says "well, I can get out of a spin so I might as well fly this airplane straight up." There are many different modes of spin in modern aircraft because of the compactness, small wings, high tails, and such that it is almost impossible to come up with one recovery technique for all modes of a spin. When this is the case, every once in a while a pilot gets into a spin mode that he doesn't know how to get out of, or can't get out of, so you lose an airplane and the pilot. I understand that a single recovery technique has been developed for the T-37,  but this doesn't erase the accidents.

This would probably be as good a point as any to wrap this up. In my opinion, you don't have to be a research pilot to realize a payoff through knowledge of equipment and the judgment to operate within its limitations and your limitations. The dividends are just as big - and I'm talking of the pilot's life now - in any airplane in the Air Force inventory. This, to me is the real meaning of safety, and the best way I know to prevent accidents.


Flight Sergeant Dolby and Corporal Podmore were the Fire/Crash crew on duty at R.R.A.F. Thornhill on 7th January, 1963.

During a stream take-off of two Vampire aircraft, the pilot of the second aircraft abandoned take-off on a red Tory signal fired by the Crash Crew.

The Fire/Crash crew had acted promptly when they noticed three small dogs run onto the runway behind the lead aircraft.

Flight Sergeant Dolby and Corporal Podmore are to be congratulated on their excellent look-out and immediate action which prevented the second aircraft from colliding with the dogs during the take-off run.

GOOD SHOW - Flight Sergeant DOLBY and Corporal PODMORE

Is this situation covered in the R.R.A. F. Supplement to A.M.P. 214 ?

(Flight International - November 1962)

The usual procedure is to draw on a map or chart a belt to include on either side of the intended track a certain number of miles as a margin, and to find by inspection the highest hill within the belt; add some arbitrary figure (e.g., 1,500 ft) for vertical clearance and the result is the safety-height. It sounds simple enough, but there are some specific principles which must be respected.

Diagram 1 is an example of the procedure (the example is a fictitious one). For flight between A and B the safety-height is clearly 2,677 ft + 1,500 ft = 4,377 ft.

Next consider Diagram 2. It looks very similar, but there is an important difference. In Diagram 1 all that was necessary was a comparison of the 1,292 ft. with the 2,877 ft. and the selection of the higher figure.

In Diagram 2, however, it is not sufficient just to compare the 1,292 ft. and the 1,573 ft.} the hill dominated by the 2,877 ft. is still relevant.

How does one know that it is still relevant ? Only from the contours; the key fact is the intrusion of the hill's contours within the belt. Without contours the picture would become Diagram 3, and who could then say whether or not the 2,877 ft. hill was relevant ? It is thus possible to formulate Rule 1 :

In determining safety-height, contours have an essential function.

Returning to Diagram 2, what is the safety-height ? The highest ground within the belt is the intruding part of the 2,000 ft. contour; and in the absence of any further evidence, the worst must be assumed, which is that it is all up to 2,877 ft. The safety-height is therefore the same as in Diagram 1, i.e. 4,377 ft. This enables us to write Rule 2 :

The effective spot-height mav not always be found within the belt: it can often be outside it.

Now look at Diagram 4. It would be easy here to make the mistake of taking the relevant hill to be the 1,573 ft, but this cannot be assumed to be the highest ground within the belt : the highest is possibly the spur of the 1,000 ft contour protruding into the belt from that same 2,877 ft hill. How high is this spur ? The part of it within the belt is shown by the contours to be above 1,000 ft but not above 2,000 ft. It has, therefore, to be assumed to be 2,000 ft and the safety-height 3,500 ft. We thus arrive at Rule 3.

The height of the highest ground within the belt is not always determined from a spot-height: it may have to be deduced from the values of the contours,

This principle is illustrated further by Diagram 5. The safety-height here should not be based on the 1,573 ft, but on the hill at the top left with no spot-height on it; this hill is potentially up to the next contour, i.e. 2,000 ft, so the safety-height is again 3,500 ft.

Comparison of the two hills in Diagram 5, i.e. the 1,573 ft, and the one without a spot-height, demonstrates that the function of a spot-height is not really to show the height of a point, but rather to show how low it is permissible to overfly the area within the contour enclosing it. This leads to Rule 4.

Within the top contour of a hill there should be one spot-height.

The correct and incorrect use of spot-heights is further demonstrated by Diagram 6; the safety-height here is not 2,138 ft. but 2,500 ft. Consider the potential height at X; from the contours one can see that it is less than 1,000 ft., but not how much less. It could in fact be up to 999 ft. anywhere, so the 638 ft. spot-height is redundant and misleading.

Therefore, Rule 5 :
Outside the top contour of each hill (i.e. anywhere between the successively lower contours or between the bottom one and the coast) there should be no spot-heights at all.

SUMMING- UP:  in calculating safety-heights it is not sufficient just to search the belt for the highest spot-height; instead it requires a logical process of deduction using the contours as the basis.


1.As the above article has received a wide circulation I feel I must help to put the subject into proper perspective and perhaps add to the 'pot'.
2.The calculation of safety altitude falls into two categories:-
(a) For Flight Planning purposes.
(b) For In-Flight purposes.
3. It appears that there is no civil in-flight procedure similar to our own for calculating safety-height, although the article does hint at the need to adopt such a procedure. The procedure we use is applicable to all types of aircraft.
4. The crucial questions in this issue are:  How ? Why ? When ? and Should ? - safety-height be calculated for both categories mentioned above.

Flight Planning
5. The current A.S.I, indicates "how" the calculation should be made. Very simply - the highest ground (NOT spot height) within 20 mm of track, plus 10%, plus 1,500 ft and the answer, normally, rounded off to the next 100 feet. For example, a flight from Thornhill to Beira (they don't let us) would involve a height of 8,004 ft. which, using the above system, gives a safety height of 10,400 ft.

6. To deal with the question "why" let us refer to the above example. Taking, say, a Provost, the pilot should file an IFR flight plan with a minimum safety Flight Level of 115 (oxygen ?) for the 'odds plus' track sector which he would have to use. Therefore, if the FIC boffins ask him to descend to FL 95 en route then he is in a position to request that he stays put.

In Flight
7. For In-Flight planning the zone calculation is much more important and takes a little longer, but relatively simple if you know the accuracy of the aids you use. The system is based on the error of the last fix and accumulates at the rate of- 10% of the air distance flown since that fix.
Should your speed be less than 300 knots TAS then it accumulates at 30 nm per hour. E.g., assume a Canberra takes a three-star astro fix in good conditions at a TAS of 420 kts. and one hour twenty minutes later the navigator wishes to construct a zone of error this is how it would look:-

 8. From the diagram it will be seen that the pre-flight 50 nm wide zone has now been replaced by one some 132 nm wide. Perhaps Mt. Canigou would never have happened if such a system had been in force.

9. Why, When and Should in this case are straight forward. When a descent is required, in an emergency or otherwise, it is nice to know how LOW it is safe to go. If the height of the ground below is established the two variables in this conjecture are :-

(a) What aids are available.
(b) How good is your pressure setting.

10. We all know our own Break-off Altitude so that deals with the first. The second is a bigger headache and the limits do need clarification. If you have the latest pressure setting you may descent to 500', if not then the limit is 7001. I leave it at that and await comments from readers.

11. The only unanswered question is "should" we pre-flight plan safety altitudes ? Taking a Canberra, on the Beira/Thornhill run the pilot is not likely to be interested in an 8,004' hill if he has to divert back to Beira. He would climb to 40,000 plus, conserve his fuel and, when calculating his zone for a descent some 80 miles out, would probably find that the highest ground he has to consider is about 1,000*. Thus the 10,400' calculation was of no use.

12. Naturally the question is where to draw the line and still keep the procedure simple. I like to think along these lines -

(a) What crews actually do now.
(b) World wide application to avoid rules of thumb.
(c) The operating height of the aircraft in service and future aircraft.
(d) Where our aircraft may operate.

13. The Canberras have been to Pakistan and Everest at 29,028 feet is not far away. This would give a safety altitude of 33,500' so I come to the conclusion that only flights below say F1 350 require a pre-flight safety altitude calculation.

14. Oh! Yes! I nearly forgot that thia was about the article, which I read a few times and came to similar conclusions. To verify the case I took a map at random and evolved an illustration of the sort of incident which might happen here in Rhodesia.

15. At position l6l7S:2807E the only spot height within 50 nm is 3250' giving a safety altitude of 5,100. This position is, in fact, close to one of our Squadron's home town which is itself at a height of 5098'! It might have been two feet the other way!

16. Well, this is the system in use, and this may be the solution to its drawbacks:-

(a) Insist on all routes being fully drawn on topographical maps.
(b) Modify the A.S.I.

The factors against 16(a) are time to get airborne,consumption of maps and the natural tendency that it is not really necessary". The last point has already been considered and I feel that, on the case put forward, if above a certain altitude no calculations were required pre-flight then perhaps no one would take the easy way out! I am sure that the defaulters are mainly the high-level types.

17. My last point is that on the "Summary of Suggested Action"
Item (l)  I am in full agreement with.
Item (2) I am not in favour with as I like to know exactly how high some places are.
Item (3) I think we all appreciate the use of contours.
Item (4) Is an excellent suggestion and is worthy of action now.
Item (5) Is well covered in Service flying.
Item (6) We have an in-flight procedure which allows for these occasions.


S.A.C.  Borejszo, an airframe fitter on No.6 Squadron, was detailed to carry out a pre-flight inspection on a Canberra During the inspection he noticed that the front pin connecting the bomb door to the hydraulic jack not split pinned and that the pin had partially moved out.

Had this pin moved out completely the jack would have become detached from the bomb door, with possible serious results, depending on the position of the bomb doors at the time.


Senior Technical Staff Officer

"I went a more technical Job."
"Squadron servicing limits my capabilities - dammit its semi- skilled work - take the 'duff' bit off and fit a serviceable bit."

"What's the benefit of mugging up real engineering theory when we never get a chance to apply it."

These and similar statements have been declared by many and various technicians employed on squadron servicing. Some technicians have made such remarks in earnest, some however, have an ulterior motive: to remove themselves from 1st line pressures, detachments, night-flying and view 2nd line work as a Haven of steady routine and set working hours.

Admittedly, squadron ground crews are restricted in the depth of their servicing tasks, especially if they have reoently experienced a T.T.B. where the Board Members have posed questions that might well embarrass a specialist design engineer!!

To go back to the beginning now you've got the drift - "I want a more responsible job than 1st line servicing offers" - this sort of statement and thinking is wrong - Wrong, WRONG, WRONG.

The work done by squadron ground crews is one of the most important and VITAL tasks. Defects located on routine 2nd line servicing fortunately have not caused an accident. Any defect found on 1st line in use aircraft, irrespective as to when it is observed, may and in certain known cases has assuredly prevented an S.O.R. or even worse a full fledged accident. The message then to 1st line crews is VIGILANCE - this must be the key note. Vigilance and close observation - keeping eyes open continuously for the most obscure and minute tell tale evidence that if not found could lead to a contingency ranging from a minor occurrence to one of grave and serious consequence.

The truth contained in the foregoing paragraphs is bome out in the text of numerous Flight Safety Magazines in that seldom do their pages contain 'Good Show! reports to technicians other than those specifically employed on 1st line servicing.

1st line Servicing Safety - the Keynote is VIGILANCE



Much has been said and written from time to tine on retention of current masks and helmets during and after ejection. So, even though no surprise - here's the straight scoop!

From 1st January, 1961 to 30th June, 1962, a total of 339 ejections were recorded in the USAF. Of this total, 71 per cent of the individuals receiving this boot in the pants retained their masks and helmet - not an enviable record, but it's the best we can give you so far. There is hope for better things, however, if we consider some of the variables - namely, the chin strap and visor.

First, let's consider the chin strap - that little piece of fabric that you carry the helmet by which when fastened becomes a rather Irritating little gadget, particularly on hot days. The record shows that with it fastened during ejection your chances are 81 per cent in favour of retention but when unfastened only 41 per cent are retained.

How about the visor ? Well, with the chin strap fastened and visor down, 91 per cent of the hard hats are kept - but with the visor up this drops to 72 per cent. On the other end of the scale, with the chin strap unfastened and the visor down only a mere 57 per cent were retained and, worse yet, with the visor up only 33 per cent kept them on.

It boils down to this: Your chances of retaining your hard hat are doubled if you will take the time to fasten your chin strap before take-off. If you will also remember to lower your visor before ejection you can increase your chances in favour of retaining your equipment by another 20 per cent. How about the old wives tale that if you fasten your chin strap, the helmet may break your neck (on ejection) ? Nothing to it! No reported cases of broken necks from this cause - that chin strap will let go long before your neck. On the other hand, many pilots landing in trees and among rocks have reported it was real nice to have that extra shell on their noggin. There's not always a soft pile of straw or sand waiting for you.

Remember - keep your head (and your hat) by fastening the chin strap before take-off and lower the visor before ejection. Assuming proper fit of helmet and mask, your chances in favour of retention are excellent.



To Calculate the EL-CEE-EN, you gotta have a lotta gen,
L.C.N., it tells you how
To put to use an aircraft's MAUW,
To make a first class runway plough.



Junior Technician du Toit

Jnr. Teoh. du Toit, an engine fitter on No.2 Squadron was carrying out a Primary Inspection on a. Vampire when he found a minute fragment of metal in the jet pipe. Further investigation revealed a number of damaged turbine blades. The engine was removed for strip examination.

On a previous occasion he intercepted an aircraft as it taxied out of dispersal - he had noticed that the ejector Seat safety pin had not been removed.

A special Good Show to Jnr.. Tech. du Toit for showing on these two occasions exceptional alertness and a conscientious approach to his duties.


Eight years ago, one rainy night, a transport aircraft began an IFR approach to a Pacific Island. The pilot reported out of three thousand. He was cleared to two thousand, but did not acknowledge. Observers saw the aircraft descend over radio towers, landing gear extended, landing lights on. Sixty—six were killed when the plane exploded against the face of a mountain nine and one-half miles north of the intended base of landing. Investigators expressed the belief that the radio towers had been mistaken for radio range station towers - both had the same lighting system.

Last year, at another Pacific Island, another transport crashed during an attempted instrument approach. This time the aircraft was on course, just 1000 feet too low.

And in between there have been many other like accidents.

In an attempt to find out what can be done to prevent such accidents from happening to perfectly good airplanes flown by qualified crews, we queried MATS, As the following point out they put much stock in the navigator.

"Navigator to pilot - over Shad intersection at 0145, ETA. Sea Isle VOR 0225, fly the 325 radial of the Sea Isle VOR". From this it sounds as though the navigator's job is finished. The flight from Lajes to Dover has reached controlled airspace and letdown for Dover will begin upon reaching
the Sea Isle VOR,

That may have been the way it was done once, years ago, but not any more. It would seem pointless for a person to complete 95 per cent of a project then close up shop and quit. However, that is the case when a navigator spends eight or ten hours guiding an aircraft across an ocean, only to turn off his equipment, fold up his charts and put his head on his arms.

This business of navigator monitoring works on departure as well as on arrival. The heart of monitoring is a comprehensive briefing, including emergency plans such as returning to the airfield after takeoff. To monitor the progress of the aircraft effectively the navigator must know what is planned. He learns this as the aircraft commander gives the before-takeoff of before-approach briefing. Prior to takeoff he must have the SID before him and must know how the radios will be set up on navaids. He copies all clearances in order to verify that the pilot reports correctly and complies with all instructions. With the aircraft commander busy flying and listening to instructions from ground controllers and with the copilot changing communication frequencies, tuning and identifying navaids, plus of course the challenge and reply checklists, a third man to constantly  check the aircraft's flight path provides a sizeable safety contribution. Transposition errors such as, cleared to 2700 feet, heading 120, aircraft actually flying heading 270, altitude 1200, are far less likely to occur. It has happened. Don't bet your life on its not happening again.

In radar equipped aircraft the navigator can make an even greater contribution. Radar provides an excellent means of checking position and terrain clearance. Though the APS-42 wasn't designed as an aircraft detection device, a good set does quite well. The navigator has much more experience and time to tune in a sharp return. From an Aircraft Accident Summary we learn, "An aircraft was cleared for an IFR takeoff (200-foot ceiling and one-half mile visibility) , Shortly after takeoff the aircraft struck a hill two miles from the end and one-fourth mile to the right of the runway, The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire. Investigation revealed no material failure. The primary cause of the accident was attributed to pilot factor in that the pilot failed to maintain his outbound track," In this case the pilot either drifted off his heading or turned too soon. A monitoring navigator should have noticed this, and possibly prevented the crash.

There's a job for the navigator on airways too. Particularly in congested areas, 500 feet too high or too low can make the difference between life and death, Policy in one unit is for navigators to call 50 feet above or below assigned altitude. Monitoring of IMF and VHF frequencies on airways allows the navigator to keep track of all instructions relayed by ground controllers. These often have to do with altitude changes and clearances to reporting points.

But, when all the hours of empty ocean are behind, when landfall is made - this is the critical period. Fatigue has had a chance to do its insidious work, mental relaxing is a natural tendency and getting every one "up" for the last crew effort provides the AC with a real challenge. A case in point , . the aircraft commander was advised that destination weather would drop below the two-mile visibility minimum. He continued and began the approach with one-fourth mile viz and a partially obscured sky. Inbound to the airfield the aircraft began to disintegrate due to unexpected contact with the terrain. The plane was destroyed by its self-generated fire three hundred yards short of the runway. Primary cause was listed as pilot factor in that the pilot descended below published minimums. The aircraft had operated normally in all respects prior to the crash. Would this accident have been prevented had the navigator called 50 feet above minimums?

Prior to arrival over the last fix before destination, the type of approach should be decided upon and the procedure outlined on the let down plate reviewed. The navigator should have his own copy of this plate and should complement this with a local area chart. He should know, before descent begins, all pertinent information - field elevation, runway headings, relationship of obstacles to the field, emergency safe altitudes and, of course, approach procedures. As the approach progresses he monitors the radios - UHF, VHP and inter phone - as well as headings, altitudes and relative aircraft position. The navigator may never be called upon to say a word. He's like the backstop on the baseball field, or the spare tire on an automobile, a useless item until a need arises. But to have him and not use him would be like turning an ILS off while making a GGA.

In addition to repeater indications of pilots navigational instruments, the navigator on radar equipped aircraft has a real ace in the hole. With radar calculates such sophisticated approaches as ILS; he can point out, or at least monitor, ranges and bearings to the field, or more important, range and bearing of obstacles. These obstacles might be high terrain, weather or other aircraft, any one of which could serve as the disastrous obstacle to a safe landing. Radar also provides him with a good cross check of the accuracy of other navigation systems - ADF, VOR, TAGAN, even GCA - systems which he has checked and assured are tuned and identified as briefed by the AC.

Some of the more modem aircraft are equipped with Doppler radar. Drift and ground speed indicators of this equipment are particularly valuable. The navigator can pass drift information to the pilot and ground speed to provide the all important, accurate ETA which means a better planned approach. Using search radar the navigator can give directions for flying an approach. With Doppler he can set information for an automatic approach similar to the ILS coupler approach.

If you plan to initiate the navigator into the departure arrival team there are a few difficulties that, forewarned may mean forearmed and smooth this phase. First is the area of attitudes. If there are those who have the idea, "He's the pilot, that's his responsibility; I'm the navigator, that's my responsibility, and ne'er the twain shall meet" . . . get the ungarbled word to these troops. Second, since navigators get little formal training in the intricacies of airways and instrument flying it is essential that navigators be completely conversant with all flying regulations and procedures. Third, navigators, especially the least experienced, show a reluctance to approach the pilot with the suggestion that he might be wrong. Standboard navigators and pilots can correct this situation. Fourth, provide the navigator with his own set of publications. If necessary, the navigator can copy pertinent information from the pilot's plates, but a duplicate set is more satisfactory.

Why not use this third man as a second pilot? The navigator has acute hearing and vision, is highly trained in planning and monitoring the path of an airborne aircraft, and has little else to do during departure and arrival. The antenna of his receptors can be locked on heading, altitude, airspeed, clearance, compliance. No mag drops or tailpipe temperatures distract him while a transmission is received from New York, San Francisco or Tokyo. If you have this third man, put him on your team!


If you haven't already read this, it may evoke a laugh ... or at least a smile. A third grader in a California school wants to "be an airline pilot when he grows up. This is his essay on the subject, as reported originally in United Air Line's 'SHIELD' magazine, UAL's employees' publication:

"I want to be an airline pilot when I grow up .... because it's a fun job and easy to do. That's why there are so many pilots flying around today.

"Pilots don't need much school; they just have to learn to read numbers so they can read instruments. I guess they should be able to read road maps so they can find their way if they get lost.

"Pilots should be brave so they won't be scared if it's foggy and they can't see, or if a wing or a motor falls off they should stay calm so they'll know what to do. Pilots have to have good eyes to see through clouds and they can't be afraid of lightning or thunder because they're closer to them than we are.

"The salary pilots make is another thing I like. They make more money than they can spend. This is because most people think plane flying is dangerous except pilots don't because they know how easy it is.

"There isn't much I don't like except that girls like pilots and all the stewardesses want to marry the pilots so they always have to chase them away so they won't bother them.

"I hope I don't get airsick because I get carsick and if I get airsick I couldn't be a pilot and then I'd have to go to work."


1. I duly crash a means of power transfer (10)
7.: Donation to expostulate disaster?- possibly but this i» no charity (4,1,7)
9.: Expel, but nevertheless an uplift (5)
11.: His might rise if you resort to 15 (3)
12.: They may break records and even glass too (4,5,4)
13.: A sharp instrument in the law laid down for carpenters (3)
14.: Duty earns a shilling and need a filter for this atmosphere (5)
15.: A sub-aqua young resident doctor, we hear. But not on the level (6,2,4)
17.: The Flight plan should be for a change of wind (10)


2.: Does this signify the challenge for a racing duel ? (7,5)
3.: Olde English 'request sounds like fire tender item (3)
4.: May be all right for midget jivers but could be disastrous to flyers (3,5,5)
5.: A prerequisite of good flight planning, (2,8)
6.: Positively non-U old ibis ribs might make them thus if resorting to cannibalism (7,5)
8. Making out load sheets at 11 p.m. could make him venomous (5,5)
9.: It seems a broken stud should be removed this way (5)
10. When to read the rest of NDEGE (5)
16. Neck-a-neck has its own implications (3)

Dear Sir,

1.: It may be presumptuous of roe to write this letter, but I know of an easy way for you to help me to help you, and I can't keep quiet any longer. When I start to fix an aircraft I'm like Jack Webb: "I need the facts." More often than not, you don't give 'em to me - in writing, that is. The proper reporting of your inflight troubles will not only cut down my work, it'll give you a safe aircraft the next tine you fly.

2.: Some pilots think that ground crew spend their time drinking coffee, playing cards, and writing "Ground-run and found Serviceable" in the Form 700, but this is not always true. Quite often, in fact, your grumbling about your aircraft condition should be aimed at yourself. In some instances brevity is appropriate, but the lack of details in many write-ups is absurd.

3.: Like most ground crew I want to do a good job and maintain a good aircraft, but without a few clues I'm lost, and I'm really frustrated going around in circles trying to figure out where to start. Perhaps a few simple rules will help to straighten things out.
(a) Write it. Talking about it with the Flight Engineer or the Duty Crew is fine, but sometimes they don't tell me about it.

(b) Write in all the details. If it's about an engine, tell me the altitude, power settings, instrument readings, temperatures. If it's about a radio, tell me which channel and whether it's the receiver or the transmitter, and what kind of noise it makes. Be specific. Don't be afraid to use more than one block for the report if you need more space. Tell me everything.

(c) Tell me what checks you have made and what the results were. You seldom stop using a piece of equipment without some effort to make it work or to find out what's wrong, and I may not be able to duplicate your tests on the ground.

(d) The last rule is to write everything down as it happens. You'd be amazed at the items people forget after they are on the ground and in a hurry to get home.

4.: I hope I've made my point, sir. With your help maybe I can get the Technical Officer off my back, give my ulcers a rest, and even quit beating my wife.




Flying whilst drunk has never constituted a significant problem in Aviation, as the result of this is obvious to all. However, flying while suffering from a hangover caused by the after effects of alcohol is of some significance and has been occasionally implicated in aircraft accidents.

Certainly no harm can come from taking one or two moderate drinks before the evening meal and then flying an aircraft the next morning. This is not true when the individual imbibes repeatedly throughout the evening and night and then flies early the following day.

Alcohol is absorbed directly into the blood where it ls accumulated.. The rate of absorption being muoh more rapid than its elimination. The distribution throughout the body is fairly uniform, except that in the brain and spinal fluid the rise and fall in concentration occur more slowly.

The body of an averaged sized individual can eliminate about one third of a fluid ounce of pure alcohol per hour. Therefore, if not more than four fluid ounces of whiskey or equivalent amount of alcohol is taken it appears safe to fly after twelve hours. If more than this amount has been consumed then at least eighteen to twenty-four hours should elapse from the time of the last drink before the pilot is fit to fly an aircraft.

The pilot, therefore, may not appear drunk but he is still under the influence of alcohol until such tine as the aloohol has been eliminated from his system, only then will his reactions and judgment have returned to normal.

Lines of yellow,
Lines of black,
Diagonally they go,
Operate when servicing-
Experimenting - NO! It
Pull to test,
Push to fire,
That's the thing to do.
Don't try it any other way,
Including you.....ENG. II

by Fg. Off. P. Marrow

1.: Introduction.
Any air-ground operations undertaken in the Aden Protectorate are likely to be against the Yemen border tribes, or dissidents within the Protectorate who receive arms, etc., from Yemen sources. These tribesmen will be well armed with modern rifles - the high-velocity 8 mm Mauser is a favourite - so don*t think they can't hurt you. If you are forced to crash-land or eject get as far away as possible from the tribesmen you have been "shooting up" : if they catch you, you will probably die, unpleasantly.

2.: Before undertaking an Operation.
Inspect your survival kit and ensure it is complete. Study your maps, and mark in any new wells, waterholes, Government forts and camps, villages and roads, etc.

3.: If you crash-land or eject.
 Stay with, or get to, your aircraft, and STAY PUT. "Walk back" only as a last resource. Your crashed aircraft will still be of use to you, you can use pieces of it to construct a shelter, for instance. Your chances of being found are better if you remain with the crash, you are easier to locate from the air than if you start walking. Furthermore, the Bedouin is intensely curious, and a crash in his neighbourhood will, for a certainty, be investigated.

4.: General hints.
(a) If possible crash-land or eject near a cultivated area - crops mean water and shade, and usually an Arab village.
(b) A date-palm oasis is also usually a sign of water in an area.
(c) Exert yourself as little as possible during the day - rig up some kind of shelter and rest.
(d) If you eat, do it after sundown - it doesn't make you so thirsty as eating by day.
(e) During the day, cover head, neck, arms and legs from the sun. A dark material is best as it reflects the sun's rays - this is why the Bedouins' tents are usually dark in colour.
(f) Remember though days in the desert are hot, nights can be bitterly cold. Do not discard any clothing, you will need it at night.
(g) When you drink, do it slowly, moistening lips and tongue thoroughly then drink in small sips. Do NOT gulp water, ration yourself and use your salt tablets.
(h) Do NOT drink un-purified water - you will get dysentery,
(j)  Do NOT drink alcohol - it makes you thirstier.
(k) Do NOT drink urine - you will poison yourself.

5.:  What the desert offers.
To a would-be survivor, the desert offers very little help. Wild life is scarce, and with only a pistol, you are in a poor position to kill game. Vegetable life is scarce and none of it contains drinkable fluid. Some plants, particularly those with milky sap, like euphorbias, are poisonous and the sap is a skin irritant. Watch out for reptile and insect life; snakes are occasionally seen, but a more common menace are scorpions. These insects like to get into one's bedding, clothing and boots for warmth, so examine these before use. A scorpion bite is not usually fatal but it is extremely painful.

A dry "wadi" or Watercourse can often be found and will provide shelter from sun and sandstorms. Furthermore, even a dry wadi may yield water - dig on the outside of curves, as water is more likely there than on the shallower inside curves. See Fig. 1.

Fig 1. Dig for water at points X

At night especially in the colder season (September-April), dew forms in the desert, and a shallow pit dug out and lined with any suitable material (parachute) will provide a small amount of moisture by condensation. Collect dew before it evaporates at sun-up.

6.: Sandstorms.
These are unpleasant, and may last for some time, but the only answer to it is DO NOT PANIC - STAY PUT. Rig up some kind of windbreak and cover your mouth and nostrils and STAY PUT. A sandstorm can, in a few hours, completely alter the contours and appearance of the surrounding country. If you give way to panic and try to walk out of a sandstorm, the sandstorm is a killer.

7.: Water.
(a) Cultivation or date plantations are usually a sign of water.
(b) Native wells and waterholes are usually very deep - you will need a long rope to lower a container, your parachute lines are ideal for this.
(c) Dry wadi beds can sometimes be made to produce water (see para. 5).
(d) Note any convergence of roads or native tracks. They usually converge at a waterhole.

(e) Note any herds of camels, goats, etc. - they will be pastured not far from water.

8. Hints on dealing with the Bedouin.
(a) Do not be in a hurry arid fluster, the Bedouin does not appreciate it. He prefers a quiet, roundabout approach to a subject.
(b) Approach a Bedouin camp from the front always. If you come on it from the rear, you may see his womenfolk unveiled. This is offensive to the Bedouin.
(c) Carry a full cigarette case - even if you do not smoke. The Bedouin appreciates being offered cigarettes.
(d) Deal always with the Sheik or headman of a tribe, or camp, or the head of a village.
(e) If offered food, eat with your right hand only. The Arab uses his left for toilet purposes, and it is the worst of bad manners to eat with it.
(f) Belching over one's food is considered highly complimentary to one's host, as showing appreciation of his good food.
(g) Kneel to eat - you will eat out of a communal dish - or sit with your feet tucked under you. It is rude to point the soles of one's feet at anyone.
(h) Offer to pay for whatever you are given, it may or may not be accepted.
(j) Do not make fun of anything the Arab does, particularly his religion and customs. Remember, he can save you.
(k) Do not mention an Arab's womenfolk in conversation in any way  as far as you are concerned, they do not exist.
(l) Ask for assistance : do not demand it.
The more you know about the Arab, his customs, and way of life the better for you - a few hour's reading on this subject may be of immense value to you. If you can learn a few words of Arabic they may come in very useful to you. A few specimen sentences are

9. Arabic.
I am an Air Force Officer from Aden
I want water: ANA ISHTEE MOYA
I want food: ANA ISHTEE AKAL
I am ill/tired: ANA MUREEBV'TABAAN
What is the name of this village ?: EISH AL ISM HAQ HATHA MAHAL ?
Is there a Government camp near here:  HUL FI MAHAL A'DOLA QARIB NA ?
Thank you: shukran/afwan/salaamtad 'eik
Does anyone here speak English ?:  HUL ANDUK EI WAHID HUNA YARED ANGREEZI ?
The Government will give you money if you send me to Aden: AD'DOLA BAGIBLUK MALI INKAAN T'URSULNI ILLA ADEN
I have here a paper from the Government: ANDI HUNA WARRAQA MIN AD'DOLA
Please send a message for me to any Government fort.

10.: Walking back.
Only attempt this as a last resort and if you do:-
(a) Walk by night and navigate by the stars as well as your compass.
(b) Walk in short spells (one hour), then rest for ten minutes.
(c) Tuck your slacks into your socks or improvise puttees - these will reduce the amount of sand you are liable to get working into your shoes and socks.
(d) Empty your boots of sand whenever you halt.
(e) Change your socks (if you have a spare pair) when you halt, otherwise swop socks from one foot to the other.
(f) Do not attempt to carry to heavy a load if you walk and ensure your load includes as muoh water as possible, even to the exclusion of other items.

11. Conclusion.
The desert is a bad country for all except those, like the Bedouin, who are born in it; it offers little help to the would-be survivor of a crash. Furthermore, the desert will kill you if you let it do so. The only answer is to TAKE THINGS EASILY - it will do you more harm than good to lose your head and act hurriedly. So  RELAX, HUSBAND YOUR WATER SUPPLY, and DO NOT FLAP, if you want to give yourself the best chance of getting out alive.

The Chart Below Shows Days of Expected Survival in the Desert

Note that by using shade or otherwise reducing temperature a few degrees is as effective and as important in increasing survival time as water.

* No exercise and remaining quiet.
** Walking at night until exhausted and resting thereafter.


Corporal Technician Borchardt

Cpl. Tech, Borchardt, an engine fitter on No. 5 Squadron, noticed what he thought to be fuel spilling from the port engine of a Canberra as it was turning out for a squadron exercise.

The aircraft was recalled and inspection of the engine revealed that the oil filler cap was open and a large amount of oil had spilled out.

Cpl. Tech. Borchardt is to be commended for his prompt action which undoubtedly saved the pilot from being faced with an emergency in flight. Certain damage to the engine was also prevented.

GOOD SHOW - Corporal Technician BORCHARDT

Aircraft: Provost T.52
Place: Near Salisbury
Date: 4th February, 1963.

1.: A pilot of No.4 Squadron R.R.A.F. New Sarum was authorised on a continuation training detail which was to include aerobatics and low flying.
2.:Half an hour after take-off A.T.C. received a message that an aircraft had crashed near the Salisbury Motel.

3.: The Board of Inquiry found that the pilot was directly responsible for the accident in that, whilst carrying out unauthorised low level aerobatics he mishandled the controls and induced a spin, from which there was insufficient height to effect a recovery.

4.: AVOIDABLE - Pilot Error.

Ndege Comment.
5. This accident brings the total number of fatal accidents since the formation of the Rhodesian Air Force to NINE. With one exception, every fatal accident resulted from either disobedience of flying orders (by the pilot), or lack of airmanship or a combination of both.

Aircraft: Alouette
Place: Seki Reserve
Date: 25th March, 1963.

1. A pilot of No.7 Squadron was on a routine squadron check and the testing officer took over control after several exercises had been completed.
2. The testing officer was occupying the centre front seat of the aircraft where a cyclic control and rudders were fitted, but no collective pitch lever. This meant that he had to fly with his left hand on the cyclic pitch and the right hand on the collective lever; that is, in the reverse to normal. As a result of this, during the approach to a landing in a cleared area in the Seki Reserve, the testing officer applied the incorrect control movements which caused the tail rotor to strike the ground.

3 The tail boom and tail rotor were extensively damaged.

AVOIDABLE - Aircrew Error.

Ndege Comment
5. The testing officer authorised himself as captain of the aircraft and accepted the aircraft in a configuration in which he could not properly exercise control for the flight involved.
6. The accident was the direct result of a deplorable lapse of airmanship on the part of the captain of the aircraft. He was held fully responsible for the accident and was interviewed by the D.C.A.S.

Aircraft: Vampire T.ll
Place: Thornhill
Date: 17th January, 1963

1.: When the pilot selected undercarriage down on the downwind leg, after a formation brake and landing, the port main wheel light remained red while the nose wheel and starboard main wheel looked down.
2.: Normal emergency procedures failed to get the port wheel down and a successful "wheels up" landing was carried out on the runway.

3.:  Investigation revealed that the tyre and inner tube had been pierced by the shank of a 1/16" drill.

4.: AVOIDABLE - Servicing Error,

Ndege Comment.
5.: In the absence of proof to the contrary it must be assumed that the drill shank was present during assembly of the inner tube and outer cover.
6. : Mod/Vamp/3320 which prevents a flat tyre from Jamming the D-door in the up position, is not embodied in R.R.A.F. aircraft and Headquarters R.R.A.F, has ruled that it will not be embodied.

Aircraft: Alouette
Place: Macheke
Date: 21st March, 1963.

1.: A pilot of No. 7 Squadron, R.R.A.F. Thornhill, was authorised on a reconnaissance flight of the Police landing zones at Macheke, Headlands and Inyazura.
2.: A landing was made at the Macheke School grounds to assess the area for a possible night landing zone. After take off the pilot gave a short flying demonstration for tho benefit of the school children.
3.: While descending to a lower altitude for a final "bow" before departing the pilot allowed the aircraft to pass into the vortex ring state and there was insufficient height to effect recovery before the aircraft struck the ground heavily.
4.: Investigation revealed extensive damage to the fuselage and tail boon.

5.: AVOIDABLE - Aircrew Error.

Ndege Comment.
6. The pilot was interviewed by the D.C.A.S.
7. The vortex ring state occurs under certain conditions when a descent, under power, is made with little forward motion. In these conditions the main rotor disc rotates within its own wake so that a ring of turbulence is formed at the end of the blades. Increasing the angle of attack on the blades aggravates the situation with the resultant increase in the rate of descent.

An accident looking for somewhere to happen.

Incomplete pre-flight briefing.
Lack of consideration for individual capabilities.
Improper evaluation of conditions or capabilities of individuals.
The individual himself.
Lack of specific, clear instructions or directions.
Failure to notify people concerned of changed conditions.
Inadequate or Improper inspection.
Allowing an unsatisfactory situation that could be corrected to exist.
Failure to provide adequate directions and regulations.
Release of improperly maintained aircraft for flight.
Failure to provide the proper training

Aircraft: Provost
Place: New Sarum
Date: 18th March, 1963

1.: A pilot was authorised to carry out an air test on a Provost after the surge valve and oil cooler unit had been replaced.
2.: After twenty minutes the pilot noticed excessive oil on the cockpit floor and returned to base. The oil temperature and oil pressure  were normal throughout the flight.

3.: A check on the oil system revealed that 4½ gallons had been lost due to the improper tightening of the oil pipe connecting the oil tank to the anti-surge valve.

4.: AVOIDABLE - Servicing Error.

Ndege Comment.
5.: During an engine change on a Provost at Thornhill in June, 1961, the bracket attaching the anti-surge valve to the fireproof bulkhead was found fractured.
6.: The oil pipe connecting the oil tank to the anti-surge valve was too short and tightening the union nut distorted the bracket. This problem was overcome by lengthening the pipe which is a standard manufactured item of fixed length.

7.: The N.C.0. i/c Aircraft Servicing Flight submitted a written report to his Station Technical Officer on his findings and on the modification required. Local station action was taken but this important information was not passed on to Headquarters to enable the correct follow up action to be taken. It has, therefore, taken this incident to produce an authorised modification to overcome a defect that had been detected two years previously I
8.: In conclusion we pose the question - why was the oil leak not discovered during the ground run ?

Aircraft: Canberra B2
Place: Near Thornhill
Date: 10th December 1962.

1.: During a routine night navigation exercise at flight level 400 the pilot of a Canberra noticed the Mach meter increasing from 172 to ,73 for no apparent reason. The engines were throttled back to regain the planned A.I.S. but the speed steadily increased. Power was reduced further, first by 50 r.p.m. and then by 200 r.p.m. with no effect on the indicated speed which by then was reading .76.

2.: The throttles were closed and air brakes selected at .78. At .84 the bomb doors were opened. The V.S.I, and altimeter indicated a high rate of CLIMB as the speed INCREASED steadily to .89 (A.S.I, reading 260 kts). Soon after reaching .89 the speed began to fall off, the nose was depressed, bomb doors closed, airbrakes retracted, but the speed continued to decrease.At .72 power was applied but the speed continued to fall off. As the needle of the A.S.I, passed through the clean stalling speed of 100 kts there was no stall indication. When the needle reached the "at rest" position on the A.S.I., there was a marked nosedown change in trim followed immediately by violent compressibility effects.

3.: The pilot regained control at 30,000 feet. This height was maintained by reference to the altimeter and engine r.p.m., the A.S.I, and Mach meter indicating ZERO. After two to three minutes the A.S.I, crept up slowly to 200 kts. and the appeared to operate satisfactorily.

4.: The pilot continued with the exercises which included dropping a bomb. A slow handling check was made before landing back at base.

5.: The pitot/static system was checked and the drain vent in the pitot head was found partially blocked* Water was present at the rear of the pitot head and some had entered the aircraft pitot pipelines,

6.: UNAVOIDABLE - Technical Defect.

Ndege Comment
7.: We have here an S.O.R. where the classification could quite easily have been "Avoidable - Aircrew Error", had there been less height available.

8.: No mention was made of the artificial horizon in the pilot's report. The A/H is electrically operated and has a good record of serviceability. The aircraft had been airborne for fifty-one minutes;  more than sufficient time for the pilot to check on the serviceability of the instrument, unless the "new instrument flying technique" does not embrace the artificial horizon! It is appreciated that the pilot had limited experience but initially we feel he did not pay attention to the basic principles.

9.: Another point which sticks out like a sore thumb is that the exercise was completed with a suspect A.S.I. Surely the two navigators in the crew on this occasion realise the dangers of dropping a bomb with the A.S.I, system suspect — UNLESS there was good reason for no longer suspecting the Air Speed Indicator.

Aircraft: Canberra
Place: Near Thornhill
Date: 7th January, 1963.

1.: At 39,000 ft. O.A.T. - 30°C Indicated, (approx -50°C True) the pilot of a Canberra, authorised for Continuation Training, raised the nose and closed the throttles. At 125 kts he lowered the nose and gently opened the throttles. Both engines immediately flamed out,

2.: At 21,000 ft, overhead Thornhill, a successful relight of both engines was effected.

3.: The Technical Officer declined to comment!

5.: AVOIDABLE - Pilot Error.

Ndege Comment.
5.:  It appears that the pilot was experimenting as a result of a previous incident at night when he got into difficulties arising from the malfunction- ing of his A,S.I, and Machmeter.

6.: The pilot was authorised on a Continuation Training detail. We find it hard to believe that this authorisation included stalling at 39,000 ft.

7.: Too often in the R.R.A.F. serious and in many cases fatal accidents have been attributed to pilots ignoring or going outside the terms of their authorisation. This pilot's irresponsible action could have quite easily resulted in the loss of an expensive aeroplane. Apart from the money involved, this would have been a totally unwarranted reduction in R.R.A.F. striking power.

Aircraft: Canberra
Place: Near Thornhill
Date: 14th March, 1963

1.: Nineteen minutes after take-off an aircraft was recalled by Thornhill approach because fuel had been seen leaking from the port engine during taxying.

2.: When the aircraft returned to base the oil filler cap on the port engine was found to be open. Five pints of oil had been lost.

3.: AVOIDABLE - Servicing Error.

Ndege Comment.
4.: Disciplinary action was taken against the airman who had not ensured security of the filler cap after a "Pre-flight" inspection.

5.: Nineteen minutes could have proved an expensive delay. It appears that due to some confusion in the control tower the wrong aircraft was checked. Fortunately the mistake was discovered and the correct aircraft was then recalled.

Aircraft: Pembroke
Place: New Sarum
Date: 6th February, 1963

1.: At 200 ft on the final approach of a practice asymmetric landing the pilot noticed a peculiar light arrangement on the undercarriage indicator. The port main wheel indicated both red and green lights, the starboard main wheel and nose wheel lights had gone out. When the pilot had selected undercarriage "Down" he had initially obtained three green lights.

2.: Overshoot action was initiated but the undercarriage would not retract and the aircraft could not maintain height.

3.: The feathered engine was restarted and the aircraft was landed safely.

4.: Six retraction tests were carried out on the undercarriage and in each case the indicator lights operated correctly. Examination of the undercarriage system revealed no defect apart from perished rubber sleeves on the port under-carriage micro-switch. These were replaced.

5.: A thorough study of the undercarriage wiring diagram showed that if there is a short in the micro-switch it is possible to obtain Red and Green lights from the same wheel at the same time.

6.: It would not be established why the undercarriage failed to retract but tests proved that a minimum pneumatic pressure of 350 p.s.i. is required to raise the undercarriage and flap

7.: Unavoidable - Technical Defect.

Ndege Comment;
8. See "Editorial".

C.A,S. - 1 copy
D.O.A.S. - 1 copy
S.A.S.O.  - 1 copy
S.O.A.  - 1 copy
S.T.S.O.  - 1 copy
D.A.P.I.  - 1 copy
S.E.S.O.  - 1 copy
O.C. V.R.  - 1 copy
C.F.S.O.-  - 1 copy
H.Q. Distribution  - 1 copy
RRAF/5059/4/Air  - 1 copy

O.C. R.R.A.F. New Sarum - 1 copy
Flying Wing - 2 copies
Technical Wing - 4 copies
Administrative Wing - 1 copy
No .3 Squadron - 2 copies
No.4 Squadron - 2 copies
No.7 Squadron - 2 copies
No.1 G.T.S. - 2 copies
S.S.Q. - 2 copies
C.E.D. - 2 copies
Officers' Mess - 1 copy
Sergeants Mess - 1 copy
Airmen's Mess - 1 copy
A.P.F.S.- 3 copies

O.C. R.R.A.F. Thornhill - 1 copy
Flying Wing - 2 copies
Technical Wing - 4 copies
Administrative Wing - 1 copy
No.l Squadron - 2 copies
No.2 Squadron - 2 copies
No.5 Squadron - 2 copies
No.6 Squadron - 2 copies
No.2 G.T.S. - 2 copies
S.A.T.C.O. - 2 copies
S.E.O. - 2 - 1 copy
S.S.Q. - 2 copies
Officers' Mess- 1 copy
Sergeants'  Mess - 1 copy
Airmen's Mess - 1 copy

No. 101 Squadron V.R. Bulawayo - 1 copy
No. 102 Squadron V.R. Gwelo - 1 copy
No. 103 Squadron V.R. Salisbury - 1 copy
No. 104 Squadron V.R. Umtali - 1 copy
No. 105 Squadron V.R. Lusaka - 1 copy
No. 106 Squadron V.R. Ndola - 1 copy
F.A.L.O. Rhodesia House - 2 copies
Federal Military Attache, Pretoria - 1 copy
Ministry of Defence - 2 copies
S.A.A.F. Headquarters - 6 copies

Avoidable ...

Avoidable ...

Eve Eden

Ack. La Boheme

End of Magazine

Thanks to Rusty Theobald for getting a scanned copy of the magazine to ORAFs.

Extracted, OCR and recompiled by Eddy Norris for use on the "Our Rhodesian Heritage blog.

Comments are always welcome, please send them to Eddy Norris at

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